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1. INTRODUCTION
In this paper we look at the general equilibrium interactions that deter-
mine the optimal level of protection for Intellectual Property (IP). There is
a large literature that explores the qualitative aspects of optimal IP policy,
and a signicant empirical literature that attempts to measure such things as
the value of patents. There is, however, little connection between the two.
Our goal is to use a relatively standard model of IP, based on that of Gross-
man and Lai [2004], and examine the quantitative implications of existing
empirical results.
Protability of an innovation depends upon three factors: the initial cost
of discovery, the elasticity of demand, and the size of the market; all these
elements vary widely and unsystematically across innovations. We focus
primarily on market size as it is substantially easier to measure than the
other two and, since current patent and copyright legislation was rst in-
troduced, it has grown steadily and substantially. Finally, the WTO-TRIPS
agreement has put the relationship between market size and harmonization
of IP at center stage.
Optimal policy involves a trade-off between increasing the monopolistic
distortion on inframarginal ideas, and increasing the number of marginal
ideas. As the scale of the market increases, depending on elasticity, it may
be desirable to give up some of the additional marginal ideas in exchange
for reduction of monopoly across the broad variety of inframarginal ideas
that will be produced anyway. In this case the optimal policy should reduce
the length of protection as the scale of the market increases. Our analysis
of a variety of data show that this is empirically relevant case.
We utilize a standard model in which IP protection is socially benecial.
1
Ideas are created subject to a xed cost. There are many possible ideas,
and to model the fact that each should have downward sloping demand, we
adopt the Dixit-Stiglitz model of preferences. The private return on an idea
is the ratio of expected monopoly revenue to its cost of creation in a mar-
ket of unit size. We focus mainly on the case in which the private return
is proportional to the social return to an idea. We show that the complex
heterogeneous mass of ideas can be analyzed by examining the total mo-
nopoly revenue from all ideas with a private return above a threshold level.
Using this tool, we show that when the market is sufciently small, it may
be optimal to provide an unlimited monopoly, but when the market is large
enough, a timelimitshouldalways be imposed, and thislimitshouldstrictly
decrease as the size of the market grows.
1We have examined the shortcomings of the standard model in Boldrin and Levine
[1999, 2002, 2004, 2005] where we argue that IP is not generally socially benecial.IP AND MARKET SIZE 2
Our model is related to a series of papers by Grossman and Helpman
[1991, 1994, 1995] studying innovation in a Dixit-Stiglitz framework. It is
most closely related, however, to Grossman and Lai [2004]. Both they and
we show that as the total monopoly revenue function has increasing (de-
creasing) elasticity, then optimal protection locally decreases (increases).
From a theoretical perspective, their approach differs from ours in two re-
spects. First, where we use a static analysis, they embed the static model in
a dynamic setting by treating costs and prots as time-ows, and examining
balanced growthpaths. Since they have already providedthis interpretation,
we simply note that this procedure is equally valid for our model. Sec-
ond, their model uses a production function approach to the creation of new
ideas. That is, ideas are of homogeneous quality, and are produced using
a constant returns technology with human capital and labor as inputs. We
use a disaggregated model in which ideas are heterogeneous both in their
quality and in their cost of creation.
2 The latter gives us a useful tool for
quantitative analysis, as the distribution of private returns from ideas can be
estimated from available data.
We also examine the (skilled) labor demand implications of the model.
It turns out that when elasticity is constant or decreasing, the demand for
labor increases by more than the increase in market scale. This ultimately
leads to a binding labor constraint. Once the labor constraint binds, the only
effect of increasing market scale is to increase rents accruing to scarce R&D
labor. Reducing IP protection reduces these rents  withno consequence for
welfare  and lowers the monopoly distortion on the innovations that are all
going to be created anyway. Hence we show, regardless of elasticities, that
sufciently large market size implies decreasing protection with increasing
market size. Our labor supply analysis also enables us to examine data on
labor demand in the R&D sector as a second source of information on the
elasticity of total monopoly revenue.
Weconcludethatboththeoreticalreasoningandempiricalevidencestrongly
suggest that we are in a region where the optimal level of protection de-
creases with the scale of the market. In addition to considering increases
in the scale of the market through growth, we reexamine the Grossman-Lai
exercise of harmonization and North-South trade from a quantitative per-
spective. Our main nding is that the North should reduce protection as a
result of harmonization.
3 In the case of two (or more) countries of equal
size, because some of the benets of higher IP protection are received by
2Their production function implies a particular distribution of private returns. We show
how to make this connection, and that the reduced form of the two models are equivalent.
3This contradicts one of Grossman-Lai's stated theoretical results; we believe that their
nding is due to an algebraic error.IP AND MARKET SIZE 3
the other country, there is a tendency to set protection too low, and there
is a harmonization argument to be made for international treaties raising
the time limit everywhere. However, this argument applies only to coun-
tries of equal size. When the countries, two or more, are of unequal size,
smaller countries tend to set low limits and free ride off the large country
 but the large country tends to set limits that are too high because it does
not account for the social benet of innovation to the smaller countries. In
this case harmonization does not mean setting limits equal to or higher
than those in the larger and more protected country, but rather adjusting the
limits to lie in between the larger protection of the larger country and the
smaller protection of the smaller countries.
2. THE MODEL
Ideas are indexed by their characteristics w, which measure the cost and
utilityof an idea and lie in W, a compact subset of Ân.4 To be invented, each
idea requires a minimum amount h(w)  0 of the only primary input, labor,
where h(w) is a measurable function. We refer to h(w) as the indivisibility,
minimum size, or xed cost for producing a new idea. The number of
ideas with given characteristics in an economy of unit size is a positive
measure h(w). We will later focus on the case where h(w) is a probability
distribution, and innovators nd their individual ideas by drawing from this
underlying distribution, but this interpretation is not essential. Allowing
numerous ideas with the same characteristics is useful because it makes it
easy to think about the possibility that doubling the size of an economy
might double the number of ideas of given cost and utility.
There is a population of size l of agents, which measures the scale of
the economy. The number of available ideas may depend on the size of the
economy, so the total number of ideas with characteristics w available in
an economy of size l is g(l)h(w). To capture the principle that in a larger
population more ideas of a given quality are available g(l) is assumed non-
decreasing; without loss of generality let g(1) = 1. Neither that the number
ofideas increases withsize atdifferent rates for differentcharacteristics, nor
that the indivisibility varies with the size of the economy, are possibilities
considered here.
Once an idea iscreated, itmay bereproduced at nocostand withoutlimit.
Iftheinputoflabory(w)isbelowthethreshold,thatisy(w)<h(w), ideasof
type w cannot be reproduced. If y(w)  h(w), then aggregate reproduction
andconsumptionisx(w)0, and consumptionper capita isz(w)=x(w)=l.
4Actually, any topological measure space will do. The importance of treating ideas as
diverse rather than using a production function for knowledge has been emphasized by
Scotchmer [1999] for example.IP AND MARKET SIZE 4
Returns from ideas are uncertain at the time the invention decision is
made; therefore it is the ex ante expected return on an idea and not its ex
post realization that matters for the decision to invent. For concreteness,
imagine that z units of an idea with characteristics w have utility net of
production costs to a representative consumer of u(z;w) with probability
p(w), while with probability 1  p(w) the idea has no utility at all and is
not produced. Normalize u(0;w) = 0, and assume that p(w);u(z;w) are
continuous in w with the latter also continuous and non-decreasing in z and,
at least up to a limit Z(w), smooth and strictly increasing.5
Let v(z;w) = p(w)u(z;w) be expected utility; let z(w), possibly innite,
be the least value such that v(z(w);w) = 0; and assume
lim
z!z(w)
v(z;w) = vC(w) < ¥:
Since v(z;w) is bounded, zvz(z;w) ! 0 as z ! z(w), that is, per capita rev-
enue6 falls to zero as per capita consumption grows to the maximum. We
also assume that zvz(z;w) has a unique maximum at zM(w).
The utility of a representative individual has a Dixit-Stiglitz form over
goods of different characteristics. Apart from consumption of idea-goods,
consumers receive utility from time spent on activities that take place out-
side of the idea sector, the marginal utility of which we normalize to one.
Denotingwith L the individualendowmentof time, the aggregate feasibility











Prot maximization and efciency require y(w) = h(w) for all ideas for
which x(w) > 0 and y(w) = 0 otherwise. Obviously, no good would be
produced in this economy absent patent protection.
5Returns can also be uncertain because the cost of an idea is uncertain. It is easy to
check that the representation of uncertainty suggested here can be applied to cost as well
as to benet.
6Prots, strictly speaking, include the xed cost of producing the idea, while revenues
should exclude the variable cost of producing z from the idea. The key variable in our
analysis is the intermediate notion of revenue net of the variable cost of production; for
convenience we refer to this simply as revenue.IP AND MARKET SIZE 5
Patent Equilibrium. Our notion of equilibrium is that of a patent equi-
librium in which there is a xed common length of patent protection for all
ideas. Thismeans that, interms ofpresent valueof theow of consumption,
a fraction 0  f  1 occurs under monopoly, and a fraction (1 f) occurs
under competition; hence f is the level or the extent of protection.7 While
the patent lasts, the innovator is a monopolist, and our economy is similar
to the traditional Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition economy. Once
a patent expires, anyone who wishes to do so may freely make copies, and
output and consumption jump to z while price falls to marginal cost and
revenue falls to zero.8 An idea is produced if, given the patent length f, the
prospective monopolist nds it protable to overcome the indivisibility.
The market for innovation is equilibrated through the wage rate of labor
w. The higher is w, the costlier it is to produce new ideas, and fewer of them
will therefore be produced. If the amount of labor used in the production of
ideas is strictly less than the total endowment lL, wages w = 1. Otherwise,
w must be chosen to reduce demand for labor to the point where the amount
of leisure is 0.
A monopolist who sells z(w) units of output to each of the l consumers
receives revenue9 lz(w)vz(z(w);w), which is assumed to have a unique
maximum at zM(w), and pays the cost wh(w). The ratio of (per capita) pri-
vatevaluetothetotalcostofinnovationisr(w)=zM(w)vz(zM(w);w)=h(w).
In fact r(w)=w represents one plus the rate of return on investment that
would accrue to the inventor of commodity w if patents lasted forever and
the market size was l= 1. We refer to r(w) as the private return for w. The
monopolist receives a fraction f of the private return, times the size l of the
market. Hence, a good is produced if
r(w)  w=fl  r:
No ideas with a r(w) lower than r, and all ideas with a r(w) above r will
be produced in the patent equilibrium. Notice that r is strictly decreasing
in fl, meaning that as the scale of the market or the extent of protection
increases, ideas with a lower private return are introduced. Notice also that,
in general, there need not be any monotone relation between the private
return r(w) of an idea and its social return; hence ideas of high social return
7We do not model the patent race by which patent is awarded; just assume that, for
each of the h(w) ideas with characteristics w, a particular individual is awarded a patent.
8We assume there are no competitive rents after the patent expires; as pointed out in
Boldrin and Levine [1999], inventors generally do earn positive competitive rents.
9If marginal cost of producing z is increasing, then we have assumed that the producer
surplus does not go to the monopolist, but to other factors of production. This assumption
seems the most empirically relevant and is for concreteness, playing no important role in
the analysis.IP AND MARKET SIZE 6
may be introduced only for high values of l, or even never at all, if their
private return r(w) is particularly low.
Per capita social welfare in a patent equilibrium is derived by integrating









so that the amount of labor required to produce all ideas exceeding any
particular private value threshold is nite.
Notice that r(w)h(w)h(w) is the total revenue of a monopolist investing






Then, M(r) is the sum of monopoly revenue over all ideas with private
value of r, or greater, in an economy of unit size. We assume that M is dif-
ferentiable and dene the elasticity of total monopoly revenue, with respect
to variations in the marginal idea, as ¡(r)   rM0(r)=M(r) > 0. We also
make the regularity assumption that ¡(r) is differentiable.
Let nM(w)  v(zM(w);w)=[h(w)r(w)] and nC(w)  vC(w)=[h(w)r(w)]
be the ratio of social value to private return of a commodity of type w under
monopoly and under competition, respectively. To x ideas, consider the




forzZ(w)and v(w;z)=b(w)Z(w)2 for z>Z(w). Thenwe havenM(w)=
3=2andnC(w)=2independentlyof characteristics. Moregenerally, wecan
dene the notion of strong return neutrality. This occurs when the ratios of
social values to private return nM(w) and nC(w) are both constant. When all
ideas are identical from the point of view of consumers, which is a common
assumption in the literature, return neutrality also holds.
From a formal point of view, the measure h(w)h(w) represents, in an
economy of unit size, the quantity of labor needed to produce all ideas
with characteristics w. Consider the measure h(w)h(w), restricted to the
s-subalgebra S of the Borel sets of W generated by the subsets of W onIP AND MARKET SIZE 7
which r(w) is constant; make the regularity assumption that it can be rep-





For any function f(w) dene a conditional value f(r), µ-almost every-







for every B  S. By return neutrality we mean that nM(r);nC(r) are con-
stant.
For the remainder of the paper, we will assume return neutrality. It is
worth noting briey what happens when this assumption fails. There are
two possibilities. If goods with lower private return have also lower social
value, in the sense that DnM(r) > 0 and/or DnC(r) > 0, common sense
and simple calculations show that this further strengthens the argument that
the length of protection should decline with the scale of the market. The
opposite case DnM(r)< 0, DnC(r)<0 might seem to have the opposite ef-
fect, reinforcing the case for increasing IP protection. In this case, however,
private return is poorly correlated with public benet. In the extreme case,
there may actually be a negativecorrelation between privateand publicben-
et. In this case, the private sector produces the ideas of least social merit
rst. Of course it can be argued that strong IP protection is needed because
that is the only way to get marginal ideas  that is, ideas of high social merit
 produced. But this argument assumes that the only policy instrument is
IP protection. If it were really the case in practice that privately valuable
innovations have little or no social value, and vice versa, then almost any
form of government intervention other than IP would be sensible. Publicly
sponsored research projects, auctioning of production rights, or subsidies
for innovators producing the socially valuable ideas would all make sense;
IP would not.
3. OPTIMAL IP PROTECTION UNDER RETURN NEUTRALITY
We rst ask howsociallyoptimalprotection  f(l)depends onmarket size.
Proposition 3.1. Suppose return neutrality. If for some  r and 0 < r <  r,
¡0(r)6=0 then there exists l suchthat  f(l)is uniqueand strictlydecreasing
for l > l. Further, when  f(l) < 1, in a neighborhood of r = 1=l f(l), the
following three cases hold. (I) ¡0(r) > 0 implies  f(l) is unique and strictlyIP AND MARKET SIZE 8
decreasing; (II) ¡0(r) = 0 implies  f(l) is unique and constant; and (III)
¡0(r) < 0 and  f(l) unique10 implies  f(l) is strictly increasing.
The details of the proof are in Appendix 1. Here we provide a sketch.
Basically, in the proof we treat the global (rst part of the proposition) and
local (second part) cases separately. The local case is analyzed by divid-
ing the rst order condition for a welfare maximum by M(1=fl) to get a











The NOC has the same qualitative properties as the rst order condition: it
has the same zeros, the same sign on the boundary and NOCf(l;f) < 0 is
sufcient for a zero to be a local maximum. In Appendix 1 we differentiate
the NOC and verify the second order and boundary conditions and apply
the implicit function theorem to prove the local results. The global case
requires examination of labor demand, which we further discuss below.
The Production Function Approach. Grossman and Lai [2004] adopt a
production function approach in which Q = F(H;L) homogeneous ideas
are produced by a xed amount of human capital, H, and labor, L, with
F a constant returns to scale concave production function. Since human
capital serves in this model only to absorb the rents from ideas, we may
as well write Q = f(L), where f is a diminishing return production func-
tion. Observe that when w = 1 the total labor cost of producing Q ideas is
f 1(Q), and the cost of the marginal idea is 1=f 0(L). Since all ideas are
equally valuable, we may as well suppose they generate revenue 1, so in
our terminology, the private return to the marginal idea produced by the Lth
unit of labor input is revenue divided by the cost of producing it, that is,
r = f0(L). The total revenue to ideas with private return r or better is then
the total number of ideas produced by the corresponding amount of labor
M(r) = f([f0] 1(r)): From this we may easily derive that the elasticity ¡
of M is the same as Grossman and Lai's elasticity of research output with
respect to labor.11
Grossman and Lai focus on the CES family of production functions. In
the case of the Cobb-Douglas production function elasticity ¡ is constant.
Less substitutability between human capital and labor implies increasing
elasticity, and conversely.
Our distributional theory gives some insight into what this elasticity is
likely to look like. Under the plausible assumption that there are ideas so
10In this case we cannot guarantee that the second order condition is satised, so we
must rule out the possibility that  f(l) has multiple values.
11In their notation, this elasticity is g.IP AND MARKET SIZE 9
bad that they have a negative private return, we expect µ(0) to be strictly
positive and nite. This implies that M(0) is nite, and M0(0) = 0, so
limr!0¡(r) = 0. Since ¡(r)  0, this means ¡0(0)  0; that is, the in-
creasing elasticity case when r is small. In other words, theoretical consid-
erations alone suggest that the function M(r) is nite and at at r = 0, and
has increasing elasticity there; we should not expect situations such as that
implied by the CES production function for high degrees of substitutability
in which elasticity is globally decreasing or even constant.
In this same direction, most common distributions give rise to increasing
elasticity. This is true for the exponential, normal, lognormal, and truncated
Pareto distributions. By way of contrast, if µ(r) is globally Pareto, then
elasticity is constant. In this case M(r) corresponds, up to a scale factor,
to the functional form implied by the Cobb-Douglas production function.
Since the Pareto density goes to innity for nite r, we would not expect it
to hold globally and, certainly, not for r close to zero. As we shall see, the
data suggest that modeling M(r) as a linear function is a plausible approx-
imation; modeling it as a Pareto is not.
Labor Demand. Our argument that for sufciently large scale of market
optimal protection must be decreasing is based on our analysis of labor
demand. Setting `(r) =
R ¥





from which, letting E denote the elasticity operator, we have
E[LD(l)] = E[g(l)] E[`(r)]:
Depending on which assumptions one makes about g(l), the rst factor
ranges from zero to any large positive number. For example, if one takes
the production function approach, then g(l) can be identied with aggre-
gate human capital H. To the extentthis is constant, E[g(l)]=0; if, instead,
H = hl, then E[g(l)]= 1. In models of growth and innovationdue to exter-
nalities or increasing returns, such as Grossman and Helpman [1991, 1994,
1995] or Romer [1990], g(l) is assumed to increase faster than l, hence
E[g(l)] > 1. A benchmark case is that in which each individual draws her
own ideas from the same urn, either with or without replacement. If sam-
pling is without replacement, and each person draws the same number of
ideas for each characteristic w, then g(l) = l and E[g(l)] = 1; if sampling
is with replacement then E[g(l)]  1.IP AND MARKET SIZE 10
As for the second factor, notice rst that the demand for labor is linked











Noticethat whenE[g(l)]>1 z, theelasticityof labor demandis predicted
to be larger than two, hence the elasticity of per capita labor demand is
greater than one. More generally, since E[g(l)]0, we have E[LD(l)=l]>
0. In other words, in the data, as the size of the economy grows, the share
of workers in the idea sector grows as well. This is the intuition underlying
the global statement in our rst proposition: if elasticity is not increasing,
then eventuallythe labor constraintmust bind. The next proposition,proven
in Appendix 1, shows how to extend from the case of constant elasticity to
decreasing elasticity of the total monopoly revenue.
Proposition3.2. ConsidertwoaggregatemonopolyrevenuefunctionsM1;M2
thathave the samevalue M1(r)=M2(r)andderivative DM1(r)=DM2(r)
(hence, ¡1(r) = ¡2(r)) at r. If D¡1(r0) < D¡2(r0) for r0  r, then
(1) Labor demand associated to M1 is smaller than the one associated







(2) The elasticity of labor demand associated to M1 is greater than the
elasticity of labor demand from M2, that is E[`1(r)] > E[`2(r)].
(3) As the elasticity of total revenue goes from increasing, to constant,
to decreasing, the elasticity of the associated labor demand func-
tions increases monotonically.
In plain words: a revenue function with decreasing elasticity implies an
elasticity of labor supply even larger than that of a constant elasticity rev-
enue function, which we have shown to be at least one in practice. Playing
this backward: should the empirical elasticity of per capita labor supply
with respect to market size be smaller than one, then the associated total
revenue function must display increasing elasticity. Per capita labor in the
idea sector growing faster than the scale of market is consistent with in-
creasing elasticity of total monopoly revenue, because E[g(l)] can be large,IP AND MARKET SIZE 11
which is independent of the elasticity of monopoly revenue. However, if
per capita labor grows more slowly than the size of the market, we must
rule out both constant and decreasing elasticity.
4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF TOTAL MONOPOLY REVENUE
Upuntilnowwehavebeen thinkingofideas asemptyboxestobe lledin
by individuals. From an empirical perspective, it is more useful to think of
eachindividualbeingassociatedwithhisownideasandhisownopportunity
costs of engaging in innovative activity. We then identify individuals with
their private returns r and think of them as equivalent to the expected value
of their ideas, with the latter being drawn from an underlying distribution
µ(r) satisfying the restrictions discussed earlier. We are interested in the
shape of µ(r) as this would allow us to compute the elasticity of M(r) at
the cutoff idea-individual r.
An issue arises at this point. In the available data we observe revenues,
zuz(w;z), not returns, r. Further, it is hard to observe directly either the
opportunity cost, w, of each inventor or the labor cost h(w) of ideas. Hence
we need to assume that, for all the ideas w in the data set, the product wh(w)
is a constant. This ensures that returns are proportional to revenues. If our
data sets contained ideas produced in very different sectors, this assumption
would be absurd. To avoid this we will try to restrict attention to sets of
goods that are relatively homogeneous, so that it is reasonable to assume
that wh(w) is roughly constant within each set. A second issue also arises
when going to the data. We set v(w;z) = p(w)u(w;z), where 1  p(w) is
the probability that the idea turns out to have no value ex post. We do not
observe vz(w;z)= p(w)uz(w;z), but rather just uz(w;z), which is the market
price of a copy of idea w. As long as p(w) does not depend on w, this means
that we will overestimate revenues but will correctly compute elasticities.
So we must assume that p(w) is constant. We have also assumed that ex
ante there is only one successful outcome; if there is a large variation in
outcomes, this too will pose a problem for data analysis.
Personal Income Distribution. Our rst attempt uses data for the U.S. in-
come distribution. That is, we make the further assumptionthat the distribu-
tion of income among creative individuals is the same as for the population
at large. This is probably incorrect when it comes to levels: creative indi-
viduals are likely to be concentrated in the upper tail of the distribution of
personal income. In any case, to the extent that the largest share of personal
income is due to labor effort and people use their creativity in accumulating
skills and choosing an occupation, this is a reasonable starting point. Let
r denote personal income here; the corresponding M(r) from the Current
Population Survey data on 2001 income is plotted in Figure 4.1.IP AND MARKET SIZE 12
FIGURE 4.1. U.S. Income Distribution
Horizontal Axis: 2001 Individual Income in $1000 USD (r)
Vertical Axis: Cumulative Income (M(r))
Source: Current Population Survey
Eyeballing is enough to realize that this curve is well t by a straight line
and poorly by a Pareto distribution. The U.S. cumulative distribution of
personal income, clearly, has increasing elasticity.
Revenue from Authorship of Fiction Books. We now examine a partic-
ular category of creative individuals: authors of ction books. Ideally one
would like to observe revenues for various books for each author, to ac-
count for the possible ex ante uncertainty about ex post sales. Such data
are not available, hence we proceed with what is available. Although we do
not have data on lifetime income of individual authors, we do have data on
the revenue generated by individual book sales. We ignore the fact that it
is costly to produce books once they are written, which is irrelevant to our
ends insofar as the cost of producing each copy of a book is independent of
the number of copies produced and sold. In summary, our assumptions are
 The opportunity cost wh(w) of writing books is constant.
 Expectedrevenuesfromthesaleofasuccessfulbookareperfectly
anticipated, and the probability of failure does not depend upon w.
 Themarginalcost ofproducingbooksissmallrelativetosalesprice.
Then income per unit of time taken to produce a book is r = lfr and,
given current copyright laws, one can safely set f = 1 in what follows. We
can compute the aggregate income of all authors who earn at least a givenIP AND MARKET SIZE 13
amount, Mr(r), and of course M(r) = (1=l)Mr(r=l) has the same elas-
ticity. We gathered data on revenues for ction books published in March
and September of 2003 and 2004, respectively; our samples range between
1,200 and 1,300 books for each of these four months. The details of the data
collection procedure can be found in Appendix 2. Figure 4.2 shows M(r)
computed on the basis of the September 2003 data.
FIGURE 4.2. _
Figure 4.3 shows a plot on logarithmic axes, including a close-up to il-
lustrate more clearly the increasing nature of the elasticity on both ordinary
and logarithmic axes.
FIGURE 4.3. Logarithmic Book Revenue (Fiction)  Sept. 2003
The data for the other months, not reported but available, yield extremely
similar results.IP AND MARKET SIZE 14
Three comments are in order. First, for less successful books the M(r)
function is nearly linear, and overall the function exhibits increasing elas-
ticity  a fact that can be seen more clearly in the logarithmic plots. The
second striking feature is the discontinuity between roughly $150,000 and
$300,000 in revenue.12 This is broadly consistent with other data on books
revenues: Leibowitz and Margolis [2003] report that less than 200 out of
25,000 titles account for roughly two-thirds of all book revenues. This is
considerably more concentrated than we nd in our data  but certainly
reects a strong discontinuity. These books appear to be predominately by
big name authors, who are largely irrelevant for optimal copyright policy:
the relevant part of the M(r) function is the part near the cutoff  that is, for
marginal, not inframarginal, books. The third fact is how small the indivis-
ibility wh(r) may be for writing and publishing ction; in September 2003,
1,181 books, out of a total of 1,223, earned $50,000 or less (correspond-
ing to total revenue of approximately $300,000. These books accounted for
50% of total revenue, that is, $6M out of $12M. The numbers for the other
months are similar. In the same data, 984 books earned less than $10,000;
hence our estimate of the marginal author's opportunity cost wh(r) should
be placed at $60,000 or less.
Patent Values. A similar analysis of the value of patents is possible  with
the reservation that it is less likely for patents that ex post value can be an-
ticipated ex ante. If we disaggregate by industry, it is at least plausible that
the xed cost of the innovation is not systematically related to the realized
revenues. We use data on the value of patents from Lanjouw [1993] for
four German industries  estimated from patent renewal rates and data on
the cost of renewal. We graph the corresponding M(r)curves in Figure 4.4.
12The sales data are from a single distributor, Ingram, constituting about one-sixth of
the book market, so total revenues would be about six times this number.IP AND MARKET SIZE 15
FIGURE 4.4. _
As can be seen, in no case are the tails similar to that of a Pareto distri-
bution  the curves fall far too close to zero. Numerical estimates can be
found in Figure 4.5. This reports for each industry and for increasing val-
ues of r, the elasticities evaluated at the midpoint of each segment of the




Computers Pharmaceuticals Textiles Engines
.22 [.17] .14 [.12] .19 [.15] .32 [.23]
.74 [.40] .53 [.33] .66 [.38] .95 [.45]
.93 [.30] .75 [.30] .88 [.31] 1.12 [.32]
3.76 [.60] 2.35 [.48] 2.42 [.44] 3.04 [.42]
2.73 [.12] 2.81 [.16] 3.02 [.14] 3.37 [.12]
With the exception of the highest category of r for computers, elastic-
ities are increasing everywhere. The values of  rM0
i(r) are also relevant
because the same f applies across sectors. Hence the aggregate distribution
is M(r) = åiMi(r), where i indexes industries. Unfortunately, the fact that
each Mi(r) function has increasing elasticity does not imply that this is true
for M(r). However, if M0
i(r) is increasing, then the corresponding elasticity
is increasing as well, and increasing  rM0
i(r) is a condition that does ag-
gregate. While not always increasing,  rM0
i(r) is increasing in the relevantIP AND MARKET SIZE 16
range, that is, at lower values of r, for all i. This implies the elasticity of
M(r) is also increasing, at least for values of r near the threshold, which is
what matters.
Our ndings for patents appear to accord well with the existing empir-
ical literature. To name but a few recent studies, Harhoff, Scherer, and
Vopel (1997) use a data set of full-term patents applied for in 1977 and held
by West German and U.S. residents. They compare the ability of various
empirical distributions, including the Pareto, to t the data and nd that a
two-parameter lognormal distribution provides the best t. Silverberg and
Verspagen (2004) use a variety of different data sources from both Europe
and the U.S.A. and two different measures of r (citations and monetary val-
ues). They nd that, while the overall distributions are well approximated
by exponential ones, it is the upper tail that is better captured by a Pareto
distribution. Asourconcern hereiswiththeshapeoftheµ(r)near thelower
cutoff value r, this is supportive of our claim. The econometric literature
on the value of patents, stemming from the paper of Pakes [1986] (see Hall,
Jaffe, and Tratjenberg [2004] for a recent update and new results), seems to
almost unanimously nd that the appropriate distribution is a log-normal or
an exponential, for both of which the elasticity of the total revenue function
is increasing.
5. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF LABOR DEMAND
As we have seen, there is a close connection between the elasticity of
total monopoly revenue and labor demanded by the ideas sector. Here we
exploitthatrelationshiptoget a secondsource of informationabout whether
the elasticity of total monopoly revenue is increasing or decreasing.
Copyright Time Series. First we apply our analysis of labor demand to a
time series of U.S. copyright. Here we must assume that the distribution
M(r) is time invariant, and that f is either constant or increasing over time
 as in fact it is. We measure the scale of the market by the size of the
literate population,13 and the amount of labor in the sector by the number
of copyright registrations. The relevant annual growth rates for the U.S. are
reported, by decade, in Figure 5.1.
13The literacy adjustment makes little difference; in 1870 when the copyright registra-
tion data begin, the literacy rate is already 80%, climbing to 92.3% by 1910.IP AND MARKET SIZE 17
FIGURE 5.1. _
If elasticity of total monopoly revenue is constant or decreasing, we ex-
pect to see per capita copyright growing more rapidly than population. This
is in fact the case prior to 1900 and after 1970, but those are both anomalous
periods. For the pre-1900 period one must notice that copyright registration
only begins in 1870, so the huge initial increase in registrations is unlikely
to reect a corresponding increase in the actual output of literary works. In
particular, it is important to realize that in 1891 it became possible for for-
eign authors to get U.S. copyrights for the rst time.14 Similarly, in 1972 it
became possible to copyright musical recordings other than phono records
 previously such recordings were protected under other parts of the law.
In 2000 6.8% of new copyrights were for sound recordings, so it is not sur-
prising that copyright registrations jumped up 1972. In 1976, the term of
copyright, which since 1909 had been 28 years, plus a renewal term of 28
years, was increased to the life of the author plus 50 years. In 1988 the
United States eliminated the requirement of registering a copyright, so after
that time, there is no reason to think of copyright registrations as a particu-
larly good measure of the output of literary works.
What all this means is that we should focus on the period between the
major copyright acts of 1909 and 1972. Here we nd that overall the lit-
erate population grew by 92%, while the number of copyright registrations
grew by only 12%. Moreover, the literate population grew faster than the
per capita copyright registrations in every decade, although in 1920-1930
and 1960-1970 the two growth rates are very similar. This is especially
dramatic because as we noted above, there was considerable technological
change during the period, with entirely new areas such as movies, recorded
14A brief history of U.S. copyright can be found at U.S. Copyright Ofce [2001a]. The
1972 change is described in U.S. Copyright Ofce [2001b].IP AND MARKET SIZE 18
music, radio, and television opening up: by 2000 only 48% of new copy-
right registrations were for literary works, while in 1909 literary works ac-
counted for the bulk of copyright registrations. Further, while the number
of copyright registrations in the U.S.A. overestimates the share of the U.S.
per capita labor dedicated to literary work, the size of the literate population
grossly underestimates the size of the relevant market. The rst is because a
large number of foreign writers register their work in the U.S.A., the second
because the growth of per capita income and, especially, the expansion of
American culture around the world greatly increased the potential market
size.
Patent Time Series. We next turn to the demand for labor used to produce
patentable ideas. One issue that arises is whether we should measure the
scale of market l by population or by GDP. Increases in per capita GDP
increase the scale of the market, but they increase the opportunity cost of
labor in the non-idea sector (working with existing ideas) by the same pro-
portion, so have no impact on the effective scale of the market. On the other
hand, increased productivity in the non-idea sector may also be reected in
increased productivity in the idea sector: double the per capita income may
mean twice as many ideas. We will focus on population as a more conser-
vative measure of l in time series data, where per capita GDP is increasing.
In the cross section we will examine both population and GDP as measures
of scale of market.
Figure 5.2 is the patent analog of Figure 5.1 and is quite similar.
FIGURE 5.2. _
Whether we measure patentable activity by patents awarded or by patent
applications, from 1890 to 1980 the growth rate of per capita patents ex-
ceeds the growth rate of population in only two decades, 1900-1910 and
1960-1970, and in both cases by only a trivial amount. In other decades,IP AND MARKET SIZE 19
the growth rate of patents per capita is much lower than population growth,
in some cases even negative. Overall, from 1890 to 1980 population grew
at a rate of 1.4% per year and per capita patents at 0.1% per year. Before
1890 patents per capita grew considerably faster than population, with a
large drop in patents from 1860 to 1870 most likely because the reform of
the patent law and patent ofce in 1861 made it considerably more difcult
to get a patent. In the opposite direction, in the period after 1980 it became
much easier to get and enforce a patent  the landmark event in this period
being the formation of a special court to try patent cases in 1982. In sum-
mary, the time series of patents lead us to the same conclusions we reached
with copyright: that patents have grown less than market size, thereby sug-
gesting that the elasticity of monopoly revenue is increasing also in this
case.
An alternative to measuring either patent applications or awards is to use
R&D expenditure as a proxy for the amount of labor used in creating new
ideas. R&D expenditure, while in principle a better measure of input than
patents, has a number of its own problems. First, the concept of R&D
expenditure is fairly fuzzy and available only for relatively recent years 
the major source of data being an NSF survey conducted since 1953. The
denition used by the NSF is creative work undertaken on a systematic
basis in order to increase the stock of knowledge, including knowledge of
man, culture and society, and the use of this stock of knowledge to devise
new applications. Firms and government agencies are surveyed and asked
to report how much they spend on this activity.
The picture of R&D expenditure as measured by the NSF is ambiguous
and yet different from that of the number of patents  ambiguous because
the choice of which measure of R&D expenditure one should consider is
not obvious. One possibility is to focus on the private sector only. How-
ever, we would expect that research nanced by the federal government 
much of which is carried out at private institutions  both produces useful
ideas and increases the demand for skilled labor. On the other hand, there
are reasons to believe that the federal expenditure in R&D reacts much less,
or maybe not at all, to market incentives and to the expected protability
of innovations in particular.15 Universities, either public or private, are ob-
viously producing ideas and employing skilled workers, but the extent to
which they respond to market incentives may have varied substantially dur-
ing the last fty years. In the light of this, we will report statistics for four
15This point is made by Jones [2004] while analyzing the R&D data and the patent
puzzle. However, we would expect some scale of market effect on federal R&D expen-
diture as well  as the scale of the market increases so does the tax base that pays for the
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aggregates: total, private sector plus universities, and these same two series
adjusted for the wage rate of college and post-college workers. The latter
are relevant because the wage skill premium increased dramatically during
the last thirty years, and workers involved in R&D activities hold college,
and most often post-college, degrees.
The ratio of total R&D expenditure to GDP has grown from 1:36% in
1953 to 2:78% in 2002, thereby doubling in fty years. During the same
time, population has grown about 80% and real GDP has almost quintu-
pled. It may be worth noticing that the maximum value for the total R&D
expenditure to GDP ratio, 2:88%, was reached in 1964. For the private plus
universities aggregate, the same ratio has more than tripled between 1953
and 2002, going from 0:63% to 2:0%. Next, assume that the cost of labor
employed in the idea sector grows, roughly, at one-half the college wage
and one-half the post-college wage.16 Then the cost of the average worker
in the idea sector between 1963 and 2002, the period for which data are
available, has grown by about 95%, while over the same period, the mean
wage has grown by about 65%.17 Between 1963 and 2002, the ratio of
total R&D expenditure to GDP basically does not move, while the indus-
try plus universities ratio goes from 0:9% to 2:0%. That is, the industry
plus university ratio grows by 110%, population grows by 52%, and total
GDP by 70%. Because our index of the relative wages in the idea sector
has grown roughly 20% over the same period, it turns out that, if one uses
total expenditure in R&D, then the share of workers in the idea sector has
actually declined, implying a strongly increasing elasticity of M(r); if, in-
stead, one uses the private plus universities measure, it has grown by about
90%. The latter is somewhat higher than either the population or the GDP
growth rates; hence, on the basis of the last index, one cannot rule out the
hypothesis that the elasticity of the total revenue function is either constant
or decreasing.18
R&D Cross Section. Finally, we look at a cross section of countries. Here
we run a simple cross-country regression with R&D as a fraction of GDP
16This is arbitrary but not unreasonable.
17High school graduate wages grew 20%, college graduate wages grew by 65%, and
post-college graduate wages grew at 123%; see Eckstein and Nagypal [2004], Figures 1
and 3.
18The number of additional caveats one would need to add is endless. The tax and
accounting treatments of R&D have both changed substantially over the period, both fa-
voring the rellabeling of many sources of cost as R&D expenditure. The Cold War and the
often changing policies of the federal governmentwith respect to nancing basic research,
carrying it out directly, or privatizing through subsidies also add additional uncertainty to
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as the dependent variable and market size and the strength of IP protection
as explanatory variables.19 We initially assume that the domestic market
is what is signicant. If ` represents per capita labor effort in the ideas
sector and we assume constant elasticity of labor demand with respect to
market size, we can write log` = Jlog(fl). To account for the effect of
both population and per capita GDP on market size, write l = yaN, where
N is population and y is per capita GDP.20 Ordinary least squares regres-
sion gives J = 0:20(0:03) and aJ = :56(0:038), meaning that a = 2:8, a
remarkably large number that, if applied to the previous time series analy-
sis would imply a strongly increasing elasticity.21 The estimated elasticity
with respect to l is nowhere close to unity. However, this assumes that
the relevant market for R&D is the domestic market. More generally, we
would measure l = ldomestic+lworld, where lworld is the fraction of world
GDP availableas a market for domesticR&D. Since regressinglog R&D on
l gives essentially the same result as regressing on ldomestic=laverage, and
regressing on log(ldomestic+lworld) gives essentially the same result as re-
gressing on ldomestic=lworld, the regression coefcient should be multiplied
by lworld=laverage. Thus, if the ratio of revenue earned on R&D in foreign
markets to domestic markets were on the order of 5, it would be possible
for the elasticity of per capita R&D with respect to size of market to be
near unitary. However, a ratio of 5 is implausibly large for most countries
with the exception, possibly, of Switzerland and Luxembourg. Exports are
almost everywhere a fraction, not a multiple of GDP. Consequently, a ratio
of 5 would be possible only if R&D were much more intensive in export
industries than the average  by a factor larger than 5. Using Lo's [2003]
detailed data from Taiwan, in 1991 export intensive industries spent about
1.8 times as much on R&D as domestic-oriented industries. Using micro-
data on renewal rates to estimate the value of patents Lanjouw, Pakes. and
Putnam[1998]nd thehighestvalueoftheimplicitsubsidyfrompatenting
abroad at 35% for the U.K. and Germany, with most countries receiving
15-20% of income from a patent from rights held abroad. So the evidence
easily contradicts the idea that lworld=laverage is on the order of 5.
19To measure the latter we use an index developed by Walter Park, to whom we are
grateful for providing us with his data. Details of the construction can be found in Park
and Lippholdt [2003].
20Standard errors in parentheses, R2 = 0:65.
21The underlyingdata include 34 countries for the period 1980-1997,and can be found
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6. IMPLICATIONS FOR NATIONAL IP POLICY
What consequencesdoes ouranalysishavefor the optimalIP policy? The
rst set of calculations indicates that IP protection for patents is probably
too high, but this conclusion is somewhat tentative. In the case of copy-
right, it seems conclusive that copyright terms are far too long. The second
set of calculations strongly indicates that the scale of market effect is quan-
titatively signicant and that there should be substantial reductions in the
length of IP term in response to size of market increases.
The rst step is to translate f  the effective degree of protection  into
the relevant policy parameter - the length of term. This depends on the
interest rate and on depreciation.
Length of Term, Depreciation, and Effective Protection. Suppose that
the real interest rate is r, that all ideas depreciate at a common rate d and
that the length of term is T. Then  with perfect enforcement  the effective
protection is f=1 e (r+d)T. Reasonable estimates of the real interest rate
lie between 2% and 4%. Since the Sony Bono Copyright Term Extension
Act of 1998, copyright protection in the U.S. is life of the author plus 70
years, or 90 years for works without an author. If we take the remaining
life of an author to be roughly 35 years, this would mean 105 years of
protection.22 CurrentpatentlengthintheU.S.forutilitypatents(inventions)
is 20 years.
Depreciation rates are more difcult. In our book data for books pub-
lished in September 2003, during the four months of 2003 revenues were
2.4timestherevenueduringthe10 monthsof 2004; meaningthatper month
sales fell by a factor of 6 over about one-third of a year, or an annual depre-
ciation rate of nearly 95%.23 Capital goods depreciation rates are generally
thought to be close to 8% per year, including housing and building, which
depreciate more slowly. Little data are available about depreciation rates of
idea so insofar as ideas correspond to generations of capital, they may well
depreciate at the same rate; some very good ideas (the law of gravity) may
not depreciate at all.
If theowof salesisconstantovertime, for acopyrightlengthofT =105
years, and different interest rates r and depreciation rates d, the correspond-
ing values of f = 1 e (r+d)T are given in Figure 6.1.
22Akerloff et al. [2002] use an estimate of 30 additional years of life and a 7% real
interest rate.
23This is consistent with data for the other months and with the general claim that the
most signicant book sales occur within three months of publication.IP AND MARKET SIZE 23
FIGURE 6.1. Effective Copyright Protection








The low values 0.02, 0.03, 0.04 for r+d correspond to no depreciation;
theintermediatevalues0.07, 0.08, 0.09correspondtoa modestdepreciation
rate of5%; we donotreport anyvalueslarger than 0.38(thatis, depreciation
between 34% and 36%) since, even with just a 20-year term, f = 1 at this
point. In summary, for realistic interest and depreciation rates, the current
copyright term certainly corresponds to f = 1 in our model, while current
patent terms correspond to roughly f = 0:9.
The Static Optimum. To determine the optimal level of protection we can











To proceed we need to know nC and nM, beside ¡. We will consider the
benchmark case of linear demand and constant marginal cost so that nC = 2
and nM = 3=2. Below we examine alternative demand structures and argue
that this benchmark case is empirically relevant.
In Figure 6.2 we report (second column) the optimal values of  f corre-
sponding to elasticities in the empirically relevant range (rst column). The
other two columns translate the optimal  f in lengths of term, using different
interest and depreciation rates.
FIGURE 6.2. Optimal Protection and Term Length
¡  f r+d = 0:2 r+d = 0:4 r+d = 0:08
0.03 0.13 7 4 2
0.10 0.24 14 7 4
0.15 0.33 20 10 5
0.20 0.40 26 13 7
0.30 0.51 36 18 9
0.40 0.60 46 23 12IP AND MARKET SIZE 24
Two facts stand out. First, optimal length of protection is less than 1 
meaningthatgiventhatelasticityisincreasing, optimalcopyrightandpatent
protection should decline with the size of the market. Second, in the case
of copyright, optimal copyright length is much less than actual copyright
length; since the actual cutoff value of r in the data is quite small, even an
elasticity of 0.05 may be a tremendous overestimate of the actual elasticity
on the margin. Certainly it is hard to justify even 7 years of copyright based
onthisdata; if we considerdepreciation not inthe empiricalrange of 95%,
but say in the range of 5%  copyright protection should be at most several
years. This is generally consistent with our scale of market calculations
below under the hypothesis that 28 years at the turn of the 20th century was
about right.
In the case of patents, estimated elasticities appeared somewhat larger,
with .15 being a sensible middle ground estimate. With a real interest rate
plus depreciation rate of 4%, this implies an optimal patent length of 10
years, while witha more realistic depreciation adjustmentit wouldbe closer
to 5 years - again, not so terribly different than what we would get if we
assumed term length were correct at the beginning of the twentieth century.
If we took the high end elasticity of .4 and a real interest rate of just 2%,
the optimal term would be 46 years; hence it is not impossible, at least in
principle, to reconcile existing patent term with available data. Realistic
estimates, though, suggest that optimal patent term should be between 5
and 10 years.
The Scale of Market Effect. To examine the scale of market effect, we










To get a feeling for this, note that in the simple and empirically relevant
case that M(r) is linear E¡ = 1+¡. Consequently Ef(l) is  1=2 or less
negativedependingon nC nM. When demand is linear nC nM =1=2, and
Ef(l) =  1=4. This means that a 10% increase in size of market should
reduce effective protection by 2.5%. For example, if the world economy is
growing at 4% per year, then a simple rule of thumb would be to reduce
protection by about 1% per year. In the case of 20-year patents that would
mean about two months each year. One implication of this is that during the
last century in which world GDP grew by a factor of roughly 40, optimal
protection should have declined from 20 years to about 1 year.
A paradigmatic case is that of popular music. Forty years ago, at the
time of Elvis Presley and the Beatles, new recordings selling a million units
wereconsideredexceptionalsuccessesandawardedgoldenrecords, whileIP AND MARKET SIZE 25
in the current times a successful record sells easily ten or twenty million
copies. The effective size of the market has, therefore, increased at least a
factor of ten. At the same time, advances in recording and digital technolo-
gies have reduced the xed cost required to produce a new record to about
one-fth of its earlier level. This suggests that the socially optimal length
of copyright protection should have dropped by about a factor of twelve.
Unfortunately, in the case of copyright, terms have been moving in the op-
posite direction; copyright terms have grown by a factor of about four since
early in the twentieth century. This means that, at least for recorded music,
they currently are on the order of a hundred times longer than they should
be. A similar calculation can be performed for books and movies. Con-
sider the fact that, since the beginning of the past century, world GDP has
grown by nearly two orders of magnitude. It is reasonable to argue that the
size of the market for books and movies must have grown at least as much
as literacy has surged, and the availability of playing devices has increased
more than proportionally due to the dramatic drop in their relative prices.
Hence, if the copyright term of 28 years at the beginning of the 20th century
was socially optimal, the current term should be a little over a year, rather
than the current term of approximately 100 years. This gives a ratio of 100
between the actual copyright terms and their socially optimal value.
Product Demand. The linear demand benchmark is particularly useful,
because it implies return neutrality, and, provided marginal cost is constant,
it is independent of it. But is linear demand empirically relevant?
Take rst the case of a small cost-saving innovation  for example, a way
of making a machine work a little better. This is the type of thing most
people think of when they think of an invention, although only a small
fraction of patents are of this type. Demand for a small cost-saving inno-
vation is equal to the per machine cost saved up to the number of machines
 then drops to zero. Since the innovation is small it has an insignicant
effect on the number of machines. In this case to a good approximation
nC = nM = 1, since we have normalized so that the monopoly prot is 1.
In this case the elasticity of total monopoly revenue does not really matter:
the social optimum is to set f = 1, and it does not change in response to the
scale of market.
More generally, it is easy to see that if demand is concave, then nM;nC 
nM are smaller than in the linear case  the extreme case being that of a
small cost-saving innovation  while if demand is convex then nM;nC nM
are larger than in the linear case. Notice that larger nM and nC nM increase
the scale of market effect, but have an ambiguous effect on the level of IP:
larger nM tendingtoincrease and larger nC nM tendingtodecrease optimal
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In understandinghowgoodthebenchmarklinearcase is, itisimportantto
recognize that demand for most innovations is strongly affected by income.
Take the case of new drugs: it is probably a good approximation to think of
willingness to pay as proportional to individual income. From 2001 census
data for the U.S., assuming that each individual demands one unit of an
innovation, with willingness to pay proportional to income, we construct
the demand curve shown in Figure 6.3.
FIGURE 6.3. Demand Proportional to Income
U.S. Income Distribution 2001
Source: U.S. Census
In other words, to a good approximation, demand based on linear En-
gel's curves is to a good approximation linear. Artistic creations such as
books, movies, and music are similar to drugs in that demand is heavily
dependent on income. In fact drugs and artistic creations are undoubtedly
superiorgoods, meaningthat the fraction of income spent on themincreases
as income goes up.
If we start with linear demand for goods that have linear Engel's curves,
then goods that are strongly superior, in the sense that the increased fraction
of income spent rises at an increasing rate, have convex demand curves.
Conversely for goods that are strongly inferior  orphan drugs are a likely
example  demand will be concave.
The conclusion is that for most types of goods, the linear demand ap-
proximation is conservative  most likely overstating the level of optimal
IP protection and understating the optimal rate of decrease in response to
market size. The exception is in the case of small cost-saving innovations 
which to a certain extent matches the idea in patent law of process rather
than product patents. Historically process patents  patents on methods
for doing things  have received stronger protection than product patents.IP AND MARKET SIZE 27
The theory indicates that this is in fact the right approach. Unfortunately,
despite the great historical success  for example, in the development of the
chemical industry  of allowing only process patents in countries such as
Germany, the Anglo-French system of allowing products the same protec-
tion as processes has become widespread.
One nal consideration is that the values of nC and nM are measured
relative to private prot, and so depend on the scope of copyright or patent.
If the scope is relatively narrow, then for a given social value of the patent,
a lower private return can be obtained, due to competition. If we let p be the
amount of prot lost to competition, then nC, nM and their difference are all
multiplied by 1=(1 p). We see, for example, that narrower scope implies
higher optimal effective protection  but also a more rapid decline with the
scale of the market.
7. IMPLICATIONS FOR TRADE AND HARMONIZATION POLICIES
We now turn to the issue of IP protection in the world economy. Since it
is the empirically relevant case, we assume throughout this section that the
elasticity of total monopoly revenue is increasing. Our goal is to examine
whether optimal trade harmonization, meaning that all countries must set
the same level of IP, results in countries increasing or decreasing their level
of IP.
It is tempting to view this as a typical tariff-like free-riding problem:
countries try to free ride off each other's innovation, and harmonization
enables them to agree on a more efcient higher mutual level of protection.
But because of the scale-of-market effect, this need not be the case. We
nd that in the empirically relevant case where only a small share of large
country patent revenue ows to small countries, harmonization demands
that the large countries lower their level of protection. Basically there are
two effects: one is that there is a tendency to underprotect because some
royalties are lost to overseas innovators. The second is the scale-of-market
effect, which works in the opposite direction.24
Consider rst the simple case in which there are several countries and
no trade is possible. In this case opening the economies to trade in goods
and ideas results only in a scale of market effect, and given our maintained
assumption that the elasticity of total monopoly revenue is increasing, by
24Grossman and Lai [2004] correctly identify the rst effect, but due to an algebraic
error, miss the second. In their footnote 28 they compare the rst order condition for a
harmonized welfare maximum to a best-response in which the foreign country does not
protect. In this comparison they treat their parameter g, which is the same as our ¡, as
having the same value in both equations. This is true only in the constant elasticity case,
meaning for their production function approach the production function must be Cobb-
Douglas, and in our distributional approach the distribution must be Pareto.IP AND MARKET SIZE 28
ourpreviousanalysisthewelfare optimumforthesetofcountriesasawhole
is to reduce protection. The more demanding case is to consider a situation
in which there is already trade, but countries engage in non-cooperative
individually optimal IP policies before harmonization sets in.
We assume that there are I countries and that each country i has a xed
fraction qi of world demand and labor, and a xed fraction ei of world ideas.
The total size of the world economy is stilll: We focus on the case in which
countriesmay notdiscriminateagainstforeign inventors,which reects cur-
rentlegalpractices aroundtheworld, anditallowsustofocusonthespecic
role of IP protection. We let fi denote the level of IP protection in country
i. Our base assumptions are that there is complete and costless free trade of
goods, that the labor constraint does not bind, and that the elasticity of total
monopoly revenue is increasing.
From an inventor'sperspective, what is relevant is the effective (weighted
by market shares) total protection received worldwide. This is simply f =
åifiqi, hence r=1=fldeterminesthemarginalinventionworldwide. Each













The rst component is the total utility that agents in country i receive from
theirconsumptionofgoodsandleisure. Thesecondistheprotsaccruingto
the monopolists located in that country, which is the difference between the
revenue from worldwide sales and the cost of labor used to innovate. The
third is the total expenditure of consumers in country i for their purchases of
goods. To get per capita welfare, we normalize this by the country popula-
tion qil. In the case of a closed economy, ei = 1 and fi = f, so the prot of
the monopolists minus the consumers' total expenditure is simply equal to
the cost of production, getting us back to the single country social welfare
function above.
Given everyone else's choice of protection, fj j 6= i, the optimum of
an individual country i is calculated by differentiating the social welfare
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Because the elasticity of total monopoly revenue is assumed increasing,
this is strictly concave in fi and continuous as a function of (fi;f), so the
IP protection game has a pure strategy Nash equilibrium, characterized by
the rst order conditions NOC(fi;f) = 0.
Our basic model then follows Grossman and Lai [2004] in assuming a
noncooperative game in which each country maximizes their own social
welfare without harmonization, and a cooperative game in which the com-
mon policy is chosen to be the worldwide optimum with harmonization. Of
course there is also the possibility that the bargaining under harmonization
will not lead to a worldwide optimum. This issue is discussed in length in
Scotchmer [2004] who argues that bargaining is likely to lead to excessive
IP protection at the expense of public sponsorship of research.
The Symmetric Case. Consider rst a symmetric equilibrium of a sym-
metric model in which qi = ei = 1=I. Holding l constant, let f1 be the
solution to the single country problem, and fI the symmetric solution to
the multi-country NOC above. Because the rst term of the NOC is posi-
tive and the second negative(I > 1), and because the second terms becomes
morenegativeas I increases, we havethat NOC(f1;f1)<0, implying,since
NOCIf < 0 under the elasticity condition, that fI < f1. More generally, fI
is decreasing in I, and as the number of countries increases the symmet-
ric Nash equilibrium converges to the case of no IP, which is suboptimal
in this setting. The intuition behind this result is ordinary: by decreasing
fI a country loses because it creates fewer new goods and gains because it
consumes at the competitive level the goods created by the remaining I 1
countries. As I increases the second margin strictly dominates the rst.
The NOC for the single country problem coincides with the social op-
timum for a global economy. Moreover, if each country is constrained to
set the same level of protection as all others, for example through a legal
mechanism such as the WTO, they would all agree to choose the social op-
timum f1. This is the standard harmonization result: in the unconstrained
protection game countries under protect due to the public goods nature of
IP protection, and a WTO-like mechanism that forces harmonization leads
them to the second best.
North versus South. Unfortunately, this analysis has little normative rele-
vance to policy analysis. Current extensions of IP are not between countries
of equal size with currently equal levels of IP. Rather, extension of IP pro-
tection is taking place between two very heterogeneous groups of countries.
The rst, consisting of North America, Europe and Japan has a relatively
large qi, an even much larger ei, and has been harmonized for around a
century on a high level of IP protection. The second group consists ofIP AND MARKET SIZE 30
developing countries with little or no IP protection. For purposes of cal-
ibration, it is convenient to focus on the most signicant of these countries:
Brazil, China, India, Mexico, and Russia. The relevant facts about GDP in
these countries and their share of U.S. patents from Hall [2001] are shown
in Figure 7.1.
FIGURE 7.1. GDP and Invention in the South
GDP Trillion U.S.$ % of World GDP (qi) % of U.S. Patents (ei)
Brazil 1.13 2.59 0.07
China 4.50 10.32 0.86
India 2.20 5.05 0.11
Mexico 0.92 2.10 0.05
Russia 1.12 2.57 0.14
Total 9.87 22.63 1.23
World 43.60 100 100
For the purposes of our numerical exercise it makes sense to assume the
Northcontrolsaboutq1 =:75of worldGDP and e1 =:987of worldideas.
We will also focus on the case in which demand is linear, so nM =3=2;nC =
2, and in which total monopoly revenue M(r) is also linear, as this seems
best supported by the data.
Why There Is No IP in the South. In the asymmetric case, smaller coun-
tries have an incentive to free ride off the larger countries. First we show
as a matter of theory that, regardless of I, the equilibrium level of aggregate
protection, f, is bounded away from zero, and small countries have little
incentive to adopt IP protection. There is one large country with shares
q1;e1 and I  1 small countries with shares qi = (1  q1)=(I   1) < q1,
ei = (1 e1)=(I 1) < e1. We prove the following proposition in Appendix
1.
Proposition 7.1. Let e f1 be the unique solution to NOC(e f1;q1e f1)= 0. Then
in any equilibrium f1  e f1 > 0 and f  q1e f1 > 0. If the number of small










the equilibrium level of protection for a small country, fi = 0.
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From our earlier analysis, we know that a plausible range for ¡ is 0.15-0.40,
while for plausible interest rates the current U.S. patent term corresponds to
a fUS in the range 0.3-0.6. Assumingrst that ei =qi and pluggingin fi =0
for a small country, we see that it is indeed optimal for a small country to





If we assume that the part of the world setting f1  0:3 consists of at least
two-thirds of the world economy  which is true of the G7 alone  then f
is at least 0:2, while ¡  0:4. This gives a lower bound for the right-hand
side of 0:3, so any country with a smaller fraction of world GDP than this
should not protect at all. Since none of the Southern countries control,
even remotely, this fraction of world GDP, this lower bound is abundantly
satised. Note that if, contrary to our assumption, ei is smaller than qi, as it
is, then there is even less incentive for the South to choose a positive level
of IP protection in the current circumstances.
Harmonization, then, requires an increase in IP in the South. Grossman
and Lai [2004] show that in addition the overall level of IP must increase
throughoutthe world, so the increase in the South must more than offset any
decrease in the North. However, this leaves open the question of whether
IP in the North goes up or down.
Why There Is Too Much IP in the North. Consider rst the case in which
e1 =1andq1 <1, thatis, all ideasare producedintheNorth. Inthiscase the
solution for the North is the solution to the social optimum problem, which
ignores supply from the rest of the world and chooses f1 to be optimal
for a market size of q1l < l. By the usual scale of market effect, that
meansthe equilibriumsolutionfor f1 islarger thanthevaluethatmaximizes
world social welfare, that is, the solution to the social optimum problem
with population l.
When some ideas are produced in the smaller country, that is e1 < 1, this
effect is weakened. This is because of the prot stealing effect mentioned
above. When the South is not protecting at all, the North has an incentive to
set a lower level of protection than if it were the only country in the world.
The reason is that if it were the only country in the world, it would retain
all the royalties from IP. However, if the South also produce ideas, then part
of the increased royalty payments made by consumers in the North is lost
to Southern monopolists. Since in this case the North sets a lower level of
IP than when e1 = 1, the prot stealing effect tends to offset the scale of
market effect from increasing IP through harmonization in the small coun-
tries. In the extreme case of constant elasticity of total monopoly revenue
 the Cobb-Douglas/Pareto case  the scale of market effect vanishes, andIP AND MARKET SIZE 32
only the prot stealing effect is left, so that it is unambiguous that the large
country should also increase IP with harmonization. This is the case studied
by Grossman and Lai [2004]. It is then crucial to check empirically which
effect dominates in the size of market versus prot stealing game, which
is what we do next.











































We take q1 = :75 throughout, but even when q1 = :66 (that is, the North is
just the G7), the conclusion holds. The RHS of the North's NOC is 3 2e1
times the RHS for the harmonized welfare maximum. On the other hand,
if world protection under harmonization were the same as the one chosen
by the North when going alone, then the LHS of the North's NOC is the
elasticity of ¡ times 1=q1 = 4=3. In the case in which M(r) is linear, the
elasticity r¡0=¡ = 1+¡, so the LHS of the North's NOC is (4=3)(1+¡)
times the LHS of the harmonized NOC. By the second order condition,
it follows that it is optimal for the North to set its protection above the
harmonized social optimum if and only if (1+¡) > (9=4) 3e1=2. What
matters, then, are the actual magnitudes of e1 and of the elasticity of the
total revenue function.
Suppose rst that the South is just as effective at producing ideas as the
North so that ei = qi = :75. In this case we see that the large country should
reduce protection upon harmonization if ¡  :125, which is certainly the
case for our range of estimates of ¡:
However, the assumption that ei = qi is not nearly true. As Figure 7.1
showed, the South controls on the order of 25% of world GDP, but gen-
erates well less than 2% of all U.S. patents. That is, the prot stealing
effect is quite small, hence there is little reason for the North in the pre-
harmonization equilibrium to decrease its protection in order to decrease
the trivial revenue from patents it loses to the South. In our calibration,
we have taken e1 = 0:987. With this calibration 1=q1 > 3 2e1 so that the
North is unambiguously setting its level of IP protection too high. By go-
ing to the data, we have not only learned that, given reasonable parameter
values, the model predicts what we seem to observe  that is, that the North
is overprotecting  but also found an answer to the question of why itIP AND MARKET SIZE 33
does so. It is not because the planner is maximizing the utility from ideas of
its q1 = :75 effective consumers but because it is maximizing the prots
of its e1 = :987 IP monopolists. Clearly, upon harmonization the North
should reduce protection regardless of the elasticity ¡; the open question is,
by how much?
By How Much Should the North Decrease IP under Harmonization?
To estimate what the actual reduction of the Northern IP should be upon
harmonization in the calibrated version of our model, we compare the solu-
tion to the NOC for the North with that for the harmonized welfare maxi-
mum, that is, the two values of f that solve our two NOC above. Let us use
the superscript 1, as in f1, to denote the elements of the North's NOC, with
no superscript for the other NOC. Then we can solve either of the NOCs to
compute the associated optimal level of IP protection. So, for example, the




with an analogous formula for the other case. Dividing the two solutions


















For ¡ in the range 0.15-0.40 this implies f1=f in the range 0.817 to 0.845,
given our maintained calibration for q1 and e1. In other words as part of
TRIPs it would make sense to have about a 15-20% reduction in length of
patent terms, from, say, 20 years to 16 years.
We have treated the North as a unitary actor. If the U.S., Europe and
Japan are not themselves harmonized, then they will tend to underprotect,
asinthesymmetriccase, anditmaybethattheoptimumisanincrease inthe
North. However the evidence that the North is internally harmonized seems
to us quite strong; indeed the U.K. is currently debating further extending
copyright on existing works in order to better harmonize with the U.S.IP AND MARKET SIZE 34
Copyright. The astute reader will have noticed we have examined only the
harmonization of patents, and not that of copyrights. Current copyright pro-
tection is effectively innite while elasticities appear to be extremely low.
As we observed, this means that copyright protection is not consistent with
welfare maximization by the North. What this means it that the social plan-
ner in the North is not setting current copyright levels to maximize social
welfare in the North but, we conjecture, to maximize the rents accruing to
theinterest groupsthatare coveredby the copyrightlaws. We cannot pursue
this line of investigationhere, but the theoretical and empirical evidence we
have collected in this paper suggests that a positive theory of IP protection
based on the rent-seeking explanation deserves, at least, a shot.
8. CONCLUSION
Our goal in this paper has been to reconcile with the economic theory
of optimal IP protection, a variety of data from different sources, ranging
from book revenues to patent values estimated by renewal rates, to R&D
expenditures. In the case of copyright, we think that evidence in favor of
increasing elasticity of total monopoly revenue is decisive and that existing
copyright terms are vastly too long: all of the different sources of data say
the same thing. In the case of patents, the evidence is less conclusive and
far more subject to measurement problems, but the best available evidence
suggests that the elasticity of total monopoly revenue is increasing in this
case as well. In both cases, our best guess as to the functional form for
M(r) would be that it is approximately linear in the relevant range. And our
quantitative analysis indicates that the scale of market effect is strong and
that as a consequence there should be both an immediate reduction in patent
terms as part of any TRIP agreement augmented by a phased reduction tied
to future growth.
Our theoretical results are robust in a variety of dimensions, while our
methods indicate directions along which data collection can be improved.
On the theoretical side, we assumed that utility is linear in the output of the
idea sector and in labor. We can consider more generally the possibilitythat
utility is concave in those variables. This strengthens the scale of market ef-
fect: As the market grows and more ideas are produced, the price in the idea
sector declines and the cost of labor increases because more labor moves to
the idea sector. Therefore, it is still best to exploit the opportunity offered
by an increase in the size of the market by reducing protection, rather than
by allowing the relative price of skilled labor to rise.
If, following Boldrin and Levine [1999, 2002, 2004, 2005], we recog-
nized that, absent any IP protection, prots for innovators would still be
substantial, the scale of market effect would also be strengthened. Indeed,IP AND MARKET SIZE 35
itcan easilybe shownthattheoptimallevelofprotectionshouldbeset equal
to zero at a nite market size, not just asymptotically as in the extreme case
of no competitive rents. This also highlights the greatest theoretical de-
ciency of standard models  the lack of adequate dynamic analysis. A
particular problem is the fact that ideas build on other ideas. As pointed
out in Scotchmer [1991] and Boldrin and Levine [1999, 2004, 2005], ideas
that use other ideas as inputs greatly weaken the case for IP because the
latter, while it encourages innovations by improving the return to the rst
inventor, discourages further innovations through raising their cost. Indeed,
when the complexityof innovationsincreases because new ones need to use
more and more old ideas as inputs, the presence of widespread IP creates
a hold-up problem where even one residual monopolist may prevent new
ideas from being implemented as in Boldrin and Levine [2005].
We have largely ignored also the important issue of rent-seeking. Sup-
pose, for example, that the size of the indivisibilitydoes not vary systemati-
cally with private returns. Then ideas with high returns are also more likely
to have high absolute levels of prot associated with them. If it is possible
to purchase extensions of protection from the governmentsector at a cost,
then it is owners of ideas with high r that have the greatest incentive to do
so, as they can leverage the extension more than anyone else. This means
thatthe marginalrms, who from a social pointof view are the reason for IP
protection, do not get much say over the length of protection. In the extreme
case the marginal rms get no protection, so the set of ideas produced is the
same as without IP, and IP serves only to introduce a monopoly distortion.
Rather remarkably, Landes and Posner [2003] recommend embodying such
a scheme in law.
Uneven depreciation of ideas has a similar effect. The basic model as-
sumesthatideas depreciate at the samerate  thatis, a givenreal timelength
of protection implies the same f for all ideas. There is some reason to think
that better ideas depreciate less quickly than the average. Leibowitz and
Margolis [2003] in particular argue that good books generate a substantial
revenue stream for a much longer period of time than poor books. Certainly
ideas that generate revenue for longer periods are, ceteris paribus, better
than those that do not, so there is reason to suspect a positive correlation.
Suppose, then, that good ideas depreciate more slowly than bad ideas, so a
highr meansalsoa longereconomiclife. ExtendingthelengthofIP protec-
tion does little to encourage the production of marginal ideas in this case,
since these depreciate very rapidly anyway. It simply serves to increase
rents and the monopoly distortion on good ideas. In the extreme case of a
one-horse-shay depreciation  ideas last a xed length of time then collapse
 there is never any reason to set the length of protection longer than the
duration of the marginal idea.IP AND MARKET SIZE 36
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APPENDIX 1: PROOFS
Proposition. 3.1. Suppose return neutrality. If for some  r and 0 < r <  r,
¡0(r)6=0 then there exists l suchthat  f(l)is uniqueand strictlydecreasingIP AND MARKET SIZE 38
for l > l. Further, when  f(l) < 1, in a neighborhood of r = 1=l f(l), the
following three cases hold. (I) ¡0(r) > 0 implies  f(l) is unique and strictly
decreasing; (II) ¡0(r) = 0 implies  f(l) is unique and locally constant; and
(III) ¡r < 0 and  f(l) unique25 implies  f(l) is strictly increasing.




We begin by analyzing the case in which the labor constraint does not bind,
so w = 1. Differentiating with respect to f and dividing out the constant


































has the same qualitative properties as FOC(l;f): it has the same zeros, the
same sign on the boundary, and NOCf(l;f) < 0 is sufcient for a zero to
be a local maximum.
We next differentiate with respect to f to nd the second order condition














The second term is unambiguously negative. The rst term has two fac-




  1 representing so-
cial surplus of the marginal idea produced; since privately it yields zero
prot, it must yield positive social surplus. If the other factor ¡0(1=lf) >
25In this case we cannot guarantee that the second order condition is satised, so we
must rule out the possibility that  f(l) has multiple values.IP AND MARKET SIZE 39
0 then there is a unique solution to the social optimization problem; if
NOC(l;1)  0, then that solution is  f(l) = 1; otherwise it is the unique
solution to the rst order condition NOC(l;f) = 0.
















which has the opposite sign to ¡0(1=lf): This covers the second half of the
proposition, when the labor constraint does not bind.
If the labor constraint does bind, increasing f only increases the wage
rate. Hence, if the social optimum is to allow the labor constraint to bind,
f must be chosen as small as possible subject to the constraint of full labor
utilization and w = 1. Consequently concavity of welfare in the interior
implies a unique optimal choice of f. This establishes a unique optimal
policy function  f(l) when ¡0(1=lb f(l))  0.
Finally, we turn to the rst half of the proposition. For small enough r
we may assume that either ¡0(r)> 0 or ¡0(r)< 0: In either case, ¡(r) must
havea(possiblyinnite)limitasr!0. Observethat¡(r) rM0(r)=M(r),
and that M(r) is non-increasing. Suppose rst that  rM0(r) does not con-
verge to innity. If it is bounded away from zero, M(r) ! ¥; implying
¡(0)= 0: If it is not bounded away from zero, since M(r) is bounded away
from zero, again, ¡(0) = 0: Hence, either  rM0(r) ! ¥ or ¡(0) = 0. The






Since ¡(0)= 0 for l sufciently large NOC(l;1)< 0 implying  f(l)< 1: It
now follows from the rst part of the proof that  f(l) is strictly decreasing.










Labor supply is lL so if DlLD  L+e for all sufciently large l, the labor
constraint must eventually bind. But  rM0(r) = r2µ(r) ! ¥ as r ! 0
so, for f bounded away from zero, DlLD ! ¥; so in this case the labor
constraint must bind. IP AND MARKET SIZE 40
Proposition. 3.2. Considertwodifferentaggregatemonopolyrevenue func-
tionsM1;M2 thathavethesamevalueM1(r)=M2(r)andderivativeDM1(r)=
DM2(r) (hence, elasticity ¡1(r) = ¡2(r)) at r. If D¡1(r0) < D¡2(r0) for
r0  r, then
(1) Labor demand associated to M1 is smaller than the one associated







(2) The elasticity of labor demand associated to M1 is greater than the
elasticity of labor demand from M2; that is, E[`1(r)] > E[`2(r)].
(3) As the elasticity of total revenue goes from increasing, to constant,
to decreasing, the elasticity of the associated labor demand func-
tions increases monotonically.
Proof. Step 1: M1(r0) > M2(r0)
Here and in what follows, r0  r holds. Then, D¡1(r) D¡2(r) < 0 by
assumption. Moreover





so D2M2(r) D2M1(r) = (M(r)=r)[D¡1(r) D¡2(r)] < 0, where M(r)
is the common value of M1 and M2 at r. Then, for r0 near r we have
M1(r0) M2(r0)  (1=2)[D2M1(r) D2M2(r)](r0 r)2 > 0
Moreover,ifM1(r00) M2(r00)<0forsomelarger r00, thenM1(r0) M2(r0)=
0 for some r00 > r0 > r, since both functions are continuous. Let  r0 be
the smallest such r0, that is, the rst point to the right of r where M1
and M2 cross. Then ¡( r0) =  r0DM( r0)=M( r0) and the assumption that
¡1( r0) < ¡2( r0) imply DM1( r0) > DM2( r0), that is, M1 crosses M2 from












































E[`1(r)] and E[`2(r)] have the same numerator, and, because of Step 2,
the rst has a smaller denominator. Hence the conclusion. 
Proposition. 7.10. Let e f1 be the unique solution to NOC(e f1;q1e f1) = 0.
Then in any equilibrium f1  e f1 > 0 and f  q1e f1 > 0. If the number of









the equilibrium level of protection for a small country, fi = 0.












Observethatfq1f1 andrecall thatNOC1(f1;f)isdecreasinginf. Hence,
NOC(f1;q1f1)  0. Since this latter expression is also decreasing in f1, a
solution to NOC(e f1;q1e f1) = 0 must satisfy f1  e f1 > 0. This in turn im-
plies that in equilibrium f  q1e f1 > 0. This shows that f is bounded away
from zero independent of k because the large country will never impose a
negligible amount of protection.
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Since there is always a unique solution to NOCi(fi;f) = 0, for I > I it
occurs at fi = 0. 
APPENDIX 2: DATA
Book Revenue. We collected all the titles, ISBN numbers, and sale prices
listed by www.amazon.com for the query hardcover ction books and for
the two publication periods of September 2003 and September 2004. The
sales data are from the Ingram stock statistics, automatic telephone line at
615-213-6803. The Ingram stock statistics system gives the following sta-
tistics for each ISBN number punched in: Total sales this year, Total
sales last year, Total current unadjusted demand, Total last week de-
mand. Total revenue for each book is calculated using the total sales data
fromIngramandtheNovember2004salespricelistedonwww.amazon.com.
Ingramisa largebookdistributor,andgenerallythoughtto generateroughly
one-sixth of all book sales. It should be noted that the sales prices on
www.amazon.com are changing over time, most often decreasing, so we
might have underestimated the revenue during the rst year for books pub-
lished during September 2003. Because of the large number of observa-
tions, we do not reproduce the data here, but it is available from
http://www.dklevine.com/data.htm.
Copyright Time Series. The basic source of the copyright registration
time series is from the annual report of the copyright ofce from 2000,
which can be found at
http://www.copyright.gov/reports/annual/2000/appendices.pdf. Thisalsoin-
cludes the breakdown of registrations by type for 2000. Population data for
1901-1999 is from the U.S. Census
http://www.census.gov/population/estimates/nation/popclockest.txt;dataprior
to 1901 is from http://www.census.gov/population/censusdata/table-2.pdf;
the two sources have a slight discrepancy for the 1900 population with the
formersourcereporting76,094,000andthelatter(whichweused)76,212,168.
The year 2000 data was from the 2000 census. Literacy rates are from
http://www.arthurhu.com/index/literacy.htm. Thedatawe usedcanbefound
at http://www.dklevine.com/data.htm.
Patent Time Series. R&D Expenditures by Sectors: National Patterns of
R&D Resources: 2002 Data Update, Table D, National Science Founda-
tion GDP: National Income and Production Account, Table 1.1.5, Bureau
of Economic Analysis. Population: 1953-1959: Population Estimates Pro-
gram, Population Division, U.S. Census Bureau, release date: April 2000
1960-2002: U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of U.S., 2004-2005.